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In the past, it appeared to many matrimonial litigants that instead of fulfilling its obligation to dispense justice, the court dispensed
with justice. With the advent of equitable distribution in 1971,' matrimonial adjudication became more complex and, hence, more pro-

tracted. 2 The escalating volume of divorce petitions similarly im-

3
peded the courts' ability to render fair decisions expeditiously.
Dissatisfaction was expressed by litigants, lawyers, and judges alike.
In 1978, even the New Jersey Bar Association labeled the matrimonial

court as a "ship head[ing] for disaster. ' 4 Visions of the Titanic
flashed across people's minds, yet little -was done to steer the ship onto
the elusive course of dispensing justice. 5
Over one-third of all divorce cases were taking more than a year
to process. 8 As matrimonial litigants awaited trial, high emotional

levels could not be contained and residual bitterness rose to the surface
when seemingly needless delays added backlog to the courts' calendars. Securing a trial date was like finding gold, and once fixed, the
trial would likely be adjourned because either the lawyers were un-
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I N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
2 Prior to the institution of the equitable distribution statute, the major issue in a divorce
case was fault. Now litigation often concerns an aggregate of complex property interests. See M.
PASHMAN, W. MOUNTAIN, S. SCHREIBER, INTERIM REPORT OF THE SUPREME Couirr COMMITTEE ON

MATRIMONIAL LITIGATION 2-3 (July 20, 1979), reprinted in 104 N.J.L.J. 97 (Aug. 2, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as INTRIuM REPoRT].
One judge has observed that "our courts are deluged with an avalanche of divorce suits. It
is said that out of every 1.8 marriages in New Jersey today, one ends in divorce." Turner v.
Turner, 158 N.J. Super. 313, 316, 385 A.2d 1280, 1281 (Ch. Div. 1978).
Between 1971 and 1979, the number of divorce filings in New Jersey doubled from approximately 13,000 to 26,000 per year. See INTERIM REPoirr, supra note 2, at 2. See also ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TIlE CouRTs, STATE OF NEw JERsEy, STATISTICAL REPor 57 (Sept. 1, 1979-Aug.
31, 1980).
4 The charac(erization was proffered at the New Jersey State Bar Association Annual
Delegate's Convention of Sept. 29, 1978.
5 The ideal of "doing justice" through the matrimonial system was the goal of the Supreme
Court Committee on Matrimonial Litigation. See SUPREME COURT COMMIrTE ON MATRIMONIAL
LITIGATION, PHASE-Two, FINAL REPORr 5 Uune 10, 1981), reprinted as a supplement to 108
N.J.L.J. 41 (July 16, 1981) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPFRT].
8 INTERIM REPorr, supra note 2, at 2.

19821

SUPREME COURT REPORT

prepared or the court had scheduled ten other cases for the same date.
Phrases like "bifurcating" and "truncating" arose as cases were heard
one day in July, one day in November, and finally decided in February. Indeed, the matrimonial bench was considered to be at the
bottom of judicial hierarchy. The system was muddled in a maze of
emotional and administrative conflict.
Cognizant of this grave situation, Chief Justice Richard J.
Hughes created the Supreme Court Committee on Matrimonial Litigation in December of 1978 to inquire into all aspects of matrimonial
procedure, and to recommend appropriate reforms. Solution, not
criticism, was the goal of the Committee. The study was divided into
two phases, the first of which resulted in an interim report which
identified the major concerns of the public, the bar, and the judiciary.' This report was the product of Associate Justice Morris
Pashman, who acted as chairman of the Committee, and Associate
Justices Worrall F. Mountain and Sidney M. Schreiber.
After intensive work by a committee expanded to additionally
include seven judges and thirteen attorneys, a final report was submitted on June 10, 1981.1 Addressing the problems brought to light by
the phase one Committee, the final report responded to the need for
reform by offering concrete proposals founded upon the fair and
expeditious deliverance of justice. A review of certain recommendations contained in the report discloses an emphasis on ameliorating the
efficiency of matrimonial procedures.' 0
I. SETLEMENT PROGRAMS

Although only a minority of matrimonial cases are actually litigated," the judicial system was geared to the trying of cases. Matrimonial judges were not allotted bench time for settlement conferences. Recognizing settlement as an effective tool of judicial
management, the Committee urged the use of early settlement programs.' 2 Involving the court in the case from its commencement
See id. at 9.
Id. at 5.
9 FINAL REPORT, supra note 5.
10 Much of the FINAL REPOrr is directed towards ensuring the prompt administration of
justice. This article will be concerned with that facet of the committee's work. However, the
committee was concerned with all aspects of matrimonial litigation. The FINAL REPORT suggests
important reforms in other areas as well.
Especially noteworthy, and indicative of a prevailing concern for this sensitive area of the
law, is the recommendation to modify the philosophy underlying child custody in order to
account for changes in the structure of the modern family unit. See id. at 49-53.
" Id. at 13.
- See id.at 7-16.
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would avoid delays and nurture resolution.' 3 No longer would judicial intervention be crisis oriented, through motion or order to show
cause. Rather, action would be initiated by the court at a time when
the case may be ripe for settlement.
The Committee proposed the implemention of experimental settlement programs consisting of two factors: a four-way conference
between the litigants and attorneys within two months after issue has
been joined, and a mandatory judicial conference within six
months.1 4 Additionally, to promote the advantages of continuing
case familiarity, the Committee recommended case calendar management on an individual basis.' 5 The expected judicial alacrity would
not only promote settlement, but facilitate issue identification.
The Committee also advocated greater participation in the early
settlement programs established through county bar associations.' 6
These programs typically consist of two or three attorneys who meet
with the litigants after completion of the discovery period. At this
point an attempt is made to settle, or at least narrow, the issues in
dispute. Although acknowledging that the success of these programs
comes at the sacrifice of the bar, the Committee commended those
participating attorneys and called for expanded involvement.

7

It

proposed the adoption of a rule authorizing judges to require attendance at early settlement programs, 8 preferably within four months
after issue has been joined.' 9 To decrease administrative costs, the
Committee suggested that the panels be composed of only two attorneys; 20 and to enhance the program's credibility, the Committee suggested that only experienced matrimonial attorneys serve on the
panels. 2' Expanded use of this program will lessen the judicial caseload and free matrimonial judges for other matters.
II.

PRELIMINARY DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Complete disclosure of all relevant information is essential to the
expedient resolution of marital disputes. Usually the most pertinent
facts are those bearing upon the financial status of the litigants.
Unfortunately, information voids have punctuated matrimonial liti3 Id. at 13.
14 Id. at 14-15.
'5 Id. at 13.
16 See id. at 7-8.
'7

See id. at 8.

18 Id., app. B.
19 Id. at 9.
20
21

Id. at 11.
Id.
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gation with appraisals, bank records, or earning statements being
unavailable from either side even on the day of trial. Despite this lack
of information, the judge is supposed to equitably distribute the assets.
Incomplete discovery often results in an adjournment, or when the
case is tried, in an appeal.
The interim report identified confusion over the application of
section 4:79-1 of the New Jersey Court Rules2 2 as being one source of
the problem. The rule commonly is utilized by judges to ascertain
which assets are subject to equitable distribution in accordance with
Rothman v. Rothman.2 3 Stressing the importance of complete disclosure at an early stage in the proceedings, the final report recommended replacement of the current rule with one requiring the submission of a comprehensive preliminary disclosure statement 24 of a
prescribed form in all divorce cases. 25 This proposal has basically
26
been adopted by section 4:79-2 of the New Jersey Court Rules.
Filing of a disclosure statement must occur within forty-five days of
issue being joined, 27 and if application is made earlier for pendente
lite relief, the application must be accompanied by a disclosure statement.2 8 The information contained in the statement must be updated
29
until twenty days before trial.
The advantages of the preliminary disclosure statement are multifarious. Its preparation will induce prompt issue identification; the
information will facilitate the processing of pendente lite applications
and provide criteria for refering cases to the early settlement program;
and the statement may also assist the court in determining whether an
award for counsel fees is proper. 30 It is not intended to be simply
additional paper work for the attorney's file.
III. MOTIONS

The Committee was aware that the status of motion practice has
also obstructed time-efficient case administration. Therefore, it initially suggested that strict limitations be placed on the granting, sub22 INTEIIM REPOrT, supra note 2, at 36-37.

23 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974).
24 FINAL RIEporr, supra note 5, at 18.

Id. In Appendix D to the FINAL RETorT, the committee provided a standard form to which
there must be compliance. For example, the submitted information would have to include a
copy of the last filed income tax returns, a balance sheet, and a budget. Id., app. D.
-* N.J. CT. R. 4:79-2.
27 Id.

8 Id.
2- Id.

W See FINAL REPoir, supra note 5, at 19.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:252

stance, and length of oral argument. 3' The Committee also suggested
that all discovery motions be submitted without the benefit of oral
argument. 3 These suggestions were ultimately endorsed by the supreme court in its comments on the interim report. 33 In the final
report, however, the Committee modified its position to suggest that
all motions be decided on the papers except for a showing of good
cause.3 4 Furthermore, it explained that because discovery motions
often present the pivotal issues of matrimonial litigation. only routine
discovery motions in a matrimonial case should be subject to a rule
against oral argument.3 5 The final report recommends that the Chief
Justice circulate a directive clarifying the use of oral argument in
motion procedure. 3
At present, there is a lack of uniformity in the state's motion
practice. Individual counties determine different procedures in attempts to expedite the hearing of motions. Many counties have
adopted the civil motion practice procedure by scheduling motion
dates every two weeks. Other counties adhere to the traditional
weekly scheduling. To prevent argument on state moving papers,
some judges have instituted a "one adjournment" rule, while other
judges have instituted "no adjournment" rules. 37 By propagating
more stringent motion rules, the Committee attempts to free additional time for judges to hear pending litigation and to allow cases to
38
be completed within shorter time periods.

Eliminating unnecessary oral argument can be a cardinal means
of improving the pace of the court calendar. The underutilization of
section 1:6-2 of the New Jersey Court Rules39 was cited by the Committee as a prime reason for mounting delays. 40 The rule provides
31 INTERIM REPorT, supra note 2, at 32.
32

Id.

33

Id.

at 22.

34 Id.

Id. at 23-25. The committee distinguished the peculiarity of matrimonial discovery motions as compared to other civil discovery motions. "The fruits of discovery, form the primar '
basis for decisions concerning equitable distributions." Id.
10 Id. at 25.
37 Motion days have traditionally consumed Friday of each week for argument, and an
additional half day, if not a full day, of preparatory time by the judge to review the filed
pleadings to formulate an order granting or denying the relief sought. N.J. CT. R. 1:6-7 directs
judges to read moving papers in advance of the hearing. A lawyer respects and appreciates the
judge who has read the pleadings, yet that respect is hard earned when multiplied by sixty
motions and cross-motions each week. It is not uncommon for matrimonial judges to spend
Thursday evening reviewing motions for the following day.
As a general guideline, the committee indicated that contested cases should be resolved
within one year of joinder of issue.
10 N.J. CT. R. 1:6-2.
40 See INTEuM RE'oR-, supra note 2, at 26.
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that an attorney may request that a motion be decided on the papers.
If the opposing party consents, or does not offer a timely objection,
oral argument on the motion is waived. 4 ' Active use of the rule by
attorneys, whenever practical, would help unclog congested court
calendars. 42 Additionally, the Committee recommends the use of
preliminary determinations as a means of eliminating other unre43
quired oral arguments.
IV.

PENDENTE LITE GUIDELINES

In states such as Arizona, fixed percentages of earnings are set as
support obligations according to charts established by the court. Similar to tax tables, the payor is directed to his earning level under the
column for his dependents, and a fixed amount would be set according to percentage tables also established by the court. 44 It was noted
in the Committee's interim report that much concern has been voiced
about the establishment of guidelines for the court's use in setting
support and alimony figures. Proponents of this approach favor the

consistency which such a system would offer. On the other hand, its
detractors find it an improper invasion of the judge's discretion. 45 The
Committee's objective was to achieve uniformity and predictability,
while not sacrificing judicial discretion.
The unique circumstances of every case preclude the decisions in

pendente lite applications from being absolutely uniform. The establishment of optional guidelines, however, would promote predictability, discourage unnecessary motions, and assist in settlement. 46 In the
final report, the Committee suggests the optional use of comprehen-

sive guidelines 47 which would allow cases to be weighed individually
but according to the same standards.
4, N.J. CT. R. 1:6-2.
11 See FINAL REPoirr, supra note 5, at 26.
11 Id. at 25-26. With a heightened emphasis on the moving papers, the bar must be prepared
to pay stricter attention to the motion rules. For example, in Brown v. Williamson, 8 N.J.L. 363
(1826), the highest court in New Jersey declared that a notice which states a motion will be made
on Friday, the seventh, when Friday is the eighth day of the month, is improper. The court,
therefore, could refuse to hear the motion.
In another regard, the New Jersey Court Rules provides that affidavits must be made on
personal knowledge, setting forth only facts upon which the affiant is competent to testify. The
comments to this rule added that "[a]ffidavits by attorneys of facts related to them by and within
the primary knowledge of their clients constitute, in effect, objectionable hearsay." N.J. CT. R.
1:6-6 (comment).
44 See Domestic Relations Handbook, Maricoba County Superior Court, Arizona (1980).
45 See INTEJUM RaPoirr, supra note 2, at 41-42.
48 See FINAL 11"rr, supra note 5, at 31-32.
47 See id., app. F. The guidelines are to be used in conjunction with the financial information submitted in the preliminary disclosure statement and can be used in determining pendente
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SPECIFIC ENDORSEMENTS OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

The Committee undertook extensive study of a variety of substantive issues presently confronting the New Jersey judiciary.48 Although many subjects were determined to be best resolved through
further study or developments in case law, 49 the Committee did issue
two pronouncements contrary to the opinions of the appellate courts
50
in this jurisdiction.
In Grange v. Grange,5 1 the appellate division held that a trial
judge does not have authority to order a pre-divorce distribution of a
tenancy by the entirety. 52 The Committee, in its final report, concluded "that the Grange rule is unduly restrictive, contrary to the
broad discretionary powers of the court of equity and generally unfair."' 53 Therefore, the Committee recommended that under exceptional circumstances, a court can order a sale of marital assets and
impose an order preserving the proceeds for the benefit of a litigant
54
who is before it.
The concept of rehabilitative alimony 55 also received a material
57
56
endorsement in the Final Report, although in Arnold v. Arnold it
had not fared as well. In Arnold, the appellate division observed that

absent unusual facts, automatic cutoff dates for alimony should be
avoided. 58 The phase-one Committee took an opposite stance, 59 and
lite applications for child support or alimony. Considerations such as the spouses' standard of
living, the length of the marriage, and earning capacity form the basis from which a decision can
be rendered. Id. The guidelines provide a specific definition as to what constitutes the needs of a
spouse. See Capodanno v. Capodanno, 58 N.J. 113, 275 A.2d 441 (1971).
48 See FINAL REPoRT, supra note 5, at 78-81. Some of the subjects considered were the
treatment of pension plans under equitable distribution and the modification of a spouse support
order. See id.
19 See id.
5 See notes 51-62 infra and accompanying text.
51 160 N.J. Super. 153, 388 A.2d 1335 (App. Div. 1978).
51 Id. at 158, 388 A.2d at 1337.
s' FINAL REPoRT, supra note 5, at 38.
m4 Id. at 38-39. 5s Rehabilitative alimony has been defined as "alimony payable for a short but specific and
terminable period of time, which will cease when the recipient is. in the exercise of reasonable
efforts, in a position of self-support." Turner v. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. 313, 314. 385 A.2d
1280, 1280 (Ch. Div. 1978).
5 See FINAL REPoRT, supra note 5, at 83-85.
57 167 N.J. Super. 478, 401 A.2d 261 (App. Div. 1979).
Id. at 480, 401 A.2d at 262. The holding in Arnold is contrary to the decision in Turner v.
Turner, 158 N.J. Super. 313, 385 A.2d 1280 (Ch. Div. 1978), in which an alimony award was
granted for only an eighteen month period. While molding the decision in Turner. Judge
Imbriani reviewed the benefits of a rehabilitative award. In addition to defining the duration
and amount of spousal obligations, the remedy encourages the development of employment
skills. Id. at 314-15, 385 A.2d at 1281.
39 See INrEFpI REPoirr, supra note 2, at 38.
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afterwards, in a footnote to Legis v. Legis,60 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey stated its disagreement with the Arnold rationale. 6 ' In its
final report, the Committee hailed the discretionary use of rehabilitative alimony as an effective judicial tool and recommended specific
criteria to be considered during such a determination. 2
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court Committee on Matrimonial Litigation was
established for the purpose of easing the emotional burdens on the
increasing number of litigants involved in contemporary divorce proceedings. Its commitment was to create a better system63 through
which litigants can solve their differences; a system which does not
lose sight of the economic and emotional difficulties besetting the
parties. The recommendations offered by the Committee certainly
make this aspiration achievable. Because of compassionate concern,
reform can now be accomplished and criticism, though constructive
in the past, is well on the way to being eliminated.
Efficient judicial administration and sound discretion are the
foundations upon which our court system is built. Ultimately, proper
implementation of the Committee's recommendations will be incumbent upon the responsible performance of the trial judge. Competent
and aggressive judicial management by the men and women sitting on
the matrimonial bench will steer the system onto the intended course
of dispensing justice. As the Committee recognizes, however, this
cannot be attained without the assistance of attorneys and their clients. 4 Through cooperation, the just resolution of all cases within
one year can become a reality.
As we move toward this goal, we must continue to respond with
sensitivity to the problems that lie ahead. Only in this way will the
matrimonial system reflect the legitimate demands of attorneys,
judges, and, most importantly, litigants.

83 N.J. 139, 416 A.2d 45 (1980).
Ild. at 155 n.9, 416 A.2d at 53 n.9. In LegEs, the supreme court held that when a prima
facie showing of changed circumstances is made, the equitable authority of a court to make
appropriate modifications of support obligations is unrestricted. Id. at 149, 416 A.2d at 50.
Justice Pashman, writing for a unanimous court, held that the duration and amount of support
payments are dependent upon the -extent of actual economic dependency." Id. at 155, 416 A.2d
at 53.
" See FINAL RE'oRT, slupra note 5, at 85-86.

b3 In this regard, the committee urges the creation of a family court which would have
jurisdiction over all disputes between members of the same family. See id. at 88-92.
Id. at 92-94.

